§ 3362 — Task Force To Counter Economic Coercion By The People’s Republic Of China

(a) It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) increasing use of economic coercion against foreign governments, companies, organizations, other entities, and individuals requires that the United States devise a comprehensive, effective, and multilateral response; (2) the private sector is a crucial partner in helping the United States Government respond to the PRC’s coercive economic practices and hold the PRC accountable; (3) improved engagement and communication with the private sector, including receiving information from the United States private sector about the PRC’s coercive economic practices would help the United States Government and private sector stakeholders conduct early assessments of potential pressure points and vulnerabilities; and (4) PRC coercive economic practices create pressures for the private sector to behave in ways antithetical to United States national interests and competitiveness. (b) Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, the President shall establish an interagency task force to be known as the “Countering Economic Coercion Task Force” (referred to in this section as the “Task Force”). (1) The Task Force shall— (A) oversee the development and implementation of an integrated United States Government strategy to respond to People’s Republic of China (PRC) coercive economic practices, which shall include— (i) systematically monitoring and evaluating— (I) the costs of such practices on United States businesses and overall United States economic performance; (II) instances in which such practices taken against a non-PRC entity has benefitted other parties; and (III) the impacts such practices have had on United States national interests; and (ii) facilitating coordination among Federal departments and agencies when responding to such practices as well as proactively deterring such economic coercion, including by clarifying the roles for Federal departments and agencies identified in subsection (d) in implementing the strategy; and (iii) forming policy recommendations for the implementation of relevant United States authorities to respond to instances of PRC coercive economic practices; (B) consult with United States allies and partners on the feasibility and desirability of collectively identifying, assessing, and responding to PRC coercive economic practices, as well as actions that could be taken to expand coordination with the goal of ensuring a consistent, coherent, and collective response to such practices and establishing long-term deterrence of such practices; (C) effectively engage the United States private sector, particularly sectors, groups, or other entities that are susceptible to such PRC coercive economic practices, on concerns related to such practices; and (D) develop and implement a process for regularly sharing relevant information, including classified information to the extent appropriate and practicable, on such PRC coercive economic practices with United States allies, partners, and the private sector. (2) In carrying out its duties under this subsection, the Task Force should regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with the following: (A) Relevant stakeholders in the private sector. (B) Federal departments and agencies that are not represented on the Task Force. (C) United States allies and partners. (d) The President shall— (1) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Security Council; (2) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Economic Council; and (3) determine the Federal departments and agencies that will serve on the task force, and direct the head of those agencies to appoint personnel at the level of Assistant Secretary or above to participate in the Task Force. (1) Not later than 1 year after December 23, 2022, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following elements: (A) A comprehensive review of the array of economic tools the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) employs or could employ in the future to coerce other governments and non-PRC companies (including United States companies) including the Government of the PRC’s continued efforts to codify informal practices into its domestic law. (B) The strategy required by subsection (c)(1)(A). (C) An interagency definition of PRC coercive economic practices that captures both— (i) the use of informal or extralegal PRC coercive economic practices; and (ii) the inappropriate use of economic tools, including those authorized under the laws and regulations of the PRC. (D) A comprehensive review of the array of tools the United States Government employs or could employ to respond to economic coercion against the government, companies, and other entities of the United States or its allies and partners. (E) A list of unilateral or multilateral— (i) preemptive practices to defend or deter against PRC coercive economic practices; and (ii) actions taken in response to the Government of the PRC’s general use of coercive economic practices, including the imposition of costs on the PRC. (F) An assessment of United States allies and partners key vulnerabilities to PRC coercive economic practices. (G) A description of gaps in existing resources or capabilities for United States Government departments and agencies to respond effectively to PRC coercive economic practices directed at United States entities and assist United States allies and partners in their responses to PRC coercive economic practices. (H) An analysis of the circumstances under which the PRC employs different types of economic coercion and against what kinds of targets. (I) An assessment of United States and international rules and norms as well as any treaty obligations the PRC has stretched, circumvented, or broken through its economically coercive practices and the United States response in each instance. (A) Not later than 1 year after the date on which the report required by paragraph (1) is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following elements: (i) Updates to information required by subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (1). (ii) A description of activities conducted by the Task Force to implement the strategy required by subsection (c)(1)(A). (iii) An assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of the strategy, lessons learned from the past year and planned changes to the strategy. (B) Not later than 1 year after the date on which the report required by subparagraph (A) is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes an update to the elements required under the report required by subparagraph (A). (3) Not later than 30 days after the date on which the report required by paragraph (2)(B) is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a final report that includes the following elements: (A) An analysis of PRC coercive economic practices and the cost of such coercive practices to United States businesses. (B) A description of areas of possible vulnerability for United States businesses and businesses of United States partners and allies. (C) Recommendations on how to continue the effort to counter PRC coercive economic practices, including through further coordination with United States allies and partners. (D) Illustrative examples. (4) The reports required by this subsection shall be submitted in classified form, but may include an unclassified summary. (1) The Task Force shall terminate at the end of the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the final report required by subsection (e)(3) is submitted to Congress. (2) may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purposes of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to Congress concerning the final report required by subsection (e)(3). (g) The Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide appropriate assistance to countries and entities that are subject to coercive economic practices by the People’s Republic of China.